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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents a perspective of the design organization in engineering projects 
based on the economic concept of the hold-up problem. By integrating the economic theories 
on the boundaries of organizations into the existing knowledge on design in engineering 
projects, the paper hypothesizes a theoretical framework that represents the design 
organization in the context of the hold-up problem. The framework is illustrated with findings 
from an interpretive study of a large-scale engineering project that faced design integration 
issues that are well explained by the hold-up problem. The findings suggest the specific 
nature of the hold-up problem in design organizations which calls for a managerial mindset 
based on the concept of the social network and relational contracting instead of the typical 
project management reasoning based on static hierarchies of scope and controlling 
mechanisms.  
 
KEYWORDS: Interdisciplinary design management, Hold-up problem, Design economics, 
Engineering project organizations.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Due to the value that they provide to the society, an increasing number of large-scale 
construction projects is delivered through various integrated approaches, which is putting an 
increasing amount of attention on design of such projects. Although a body of research exists 
elaborating the topics of design and its management in the engineering project industries, the 
economic aspects of managing design at the project and firm level are still not adequately 
represented in scholarly literature on engineering projects. 
One of the most persisting issues of design in complex projects is its integration. 
Because it is an iterative activity, it is reasonable to count on multiple sets of contributions 
from the participating designers and teams. This paper will address the scope of the design 
organization by focusing on the issue of design integration in large scale engineering design. 
By implementing economic theories on organizational boundaries, in this paper we will 
discuss how project-level design integration issues can be interpreted as a hold-up problem 
with implications for the organizational boundaries.  
The structure of the paper begins with a summary of general design literature, which 
is then complemented with corresponding developments in the area of engineering project 
organizations. The subsequent part of the paper introduces the most relevant streams of 
theorizing economic boundaries of organizations. In the following part, we propose a 
conceptual framework the application of economic theories of organization to the engineering 
project design context. By using empirical data from a case study, the paper then discusses 
how the issue of design integration can be interpreted from the angle of economic theories of 
organizational boundaries. The paper concludes with an discussion section complemented 
with a list of recommendations for practitioners in the engineering project domain.  
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DESIGN AND ITS MANAGEMENT IN ENGINEERING PROJECTS 
In a very broad sense, design can be interpreted as the social construction of 
knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 2007/1966) about the project to be built. This collective 
knowledge then emerges from individual boundedly-rational cognitive frames (Simon 
1996/1969). The two mentioned concepts have provided a stepping stone for researchers to 
focus on individual cognition (e.g. Rittel and Webber 1973; Schön 1983; Hubka and Eder 
1987; Pahl et al. 1996) and social interaction (e.g. Bucciarelli 1984; Cross and Clayburn 
Cross 1995; Bucciarelli 2002) as the main aspects of the design process. While the cognition 
stream elaborates the rationality of each individual designer’s perspective, the social stream 
of research in design attempts to integrate the different individual perspectives in a jointly 
negotiated meaning of the project and its underlying functions.  
In practice, design occurs when teams of individual experts put their contributions 
into the design decision-making and consensus-building activities. Such experts come from 
either the core project team, or act as external experts who operate on the design market and 
whose services are bought for a fee. The main resource for designing is, therefore, expertise, 
coming either as individual or organizational domain-specific knowledge (Lawson and Dorst 
2009). 
When someone is considered an expert in a field, this is normally an indication that 
the person possesses individual domain-specific knowledge that he or she acquired as a 
structured effort over the course of a number of years. Design firms, therefore, summon a 
pool of individual expert practitioners whose knowledge is idiosyncratic and specific to a 
design task. Since the design task by definition is not precisely defined, the expert designers 
will both frame the problem from the perceived situation and offer a solution for the problem 
by using their idiosyncratic design knowledge. This means that the expert’s contribution will 
be as unique as the psychological frame, from which he/she approaches the problem (Schön 
1983). This also means that the designers will attend to the problem by framing it from the 
perspective of their expertise educational background, and culture.    
As Lawson and Dorst (2009) acknowledge, instead of looking at the design team as a 
group of independent individuals with domain-specific knowledge, a successful design team 
should be viewed as a group of people with shared beliefs and value systems. Throughout the 
design effort, the design team socially constructs information from a set of different cognitive 
frames. This knowledge construction, however, follows the shared values from within the 
design team. It is therefore a social process, characterized by collective domain-specific 
knowledge, created through strong cognitive and cultural framing. The designer’s 
professional expertise is, therefore, not entirely subject to an explicit articulation, as it is 
largely tacit and implicit.  
The engineering project sector has been facing an increasing demand for integration at 
the global level. This is mainly caused by global policy developments in line with increasing 
the productivity and sustainability of the construction sector.  The result is that an increasing 
amount of attention is being paid to the performance of the buildings in terms of 
sustainability indicators, which, in turn, also motivated the need to integrate the design effort 
around teams of collaborative interdisciplinary contributions. In such a setting, design 
normally includes a large number of design professionals and other stakeholders who all 
jointly contribute to design decisions. Due to the scale of many of such projects, issues of 
design integration have a significant economic impact on not only the design itself, but also 
the entire downstream project and the lifecycle of the resulting building. As a result, research 
on design and engineering in the construction sector received a significant amount of 
explanatory and normative attention in literature at various levels of analysis. The aim of the 
following passages is by no means to provide an extensive review of the developments in the 
field of engineering design organizations, as this would be a very difficult task to perform. 
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Instead, our intent was to summarize some of the most evident research directions for the 
purpose of demonstrating the theoretical pluralism of the field.  
At the micro-level of design, different theoretical angles were used to explicate 
insights spanning from individual design thinking (Lawson 2005) to team interaction, most 
notably, micro-sociological explanations of the role of digital visual infrastructure for design 
interactions (Whyte et al. 2007; Whyte 2011), micro-level ethnomethodological approaches 
to design interaction (Luck 2003, 2010), and sociological theories of diffusion of digital 
decision-support systems into the team organizational culture (Hartmann and Levitt 2010; 
Hartmann 2011). At the level of individual designers and design teams, most research, 
therefore conceptualizes design as the development of artifacts through social interaction 
mediated by boundary objects used to bridge the differences in designers’ narratives.  
The other stream of research of engineering projects acknowledged the importance of 
factors at the macro-organizational level of design. Some of the examples of such studies 
researched the interplay of institutional factors in construction projects (Mahalingam and 
Levitt 2007), and the management of the corresponding knowledge (Javernick-Will and Scott 
2010; Javernick-Will 2011) in a multinational context. Although these issues barely scratch 
the surface of the vast and complex field of psychological, social, political, and cultural 
aspects influencing engineering projects (Henisz et al. 2012), they can be considered as 
valuable cornerstones in defining the range of issues that need to be taken into account in 
design. 
The context of the engineering sector is such that the project can be considered the 
main subject of production, whereas the engineering structure can be considered the object of 
production. Since such structures need to meet an increasing volume of requirements, a 
stream of research developed that links the process level of design with the performance of 
the building according to these predefined requirements.  
The most prominent pieces of research in this context come from the sustainability 
camp of the AEC sector and they study the achieved performance of the buildings in relation 
to project arrangements best meet the performance. This stream of research confirms that 
collaboration at the team level is the preferred way of achieving better sustainability 
performance indicators of buildings (Korkmaz et al. 2010; Swarup et al. 2011). To measure 
and improve the level of collaboration and interaction, different studies have researched 
collaboration aspects of engineering projects. In the conceptual phases, this refers to 
designing the governance arrangements in projects (i.e., DeWulf and Kadefors 2011). In 
downstream project phases, collaboration is approached differently. Chinowsky et al. (2011), 
for instance use social network analysis to introduce the idea of aligning the task-level 
knowledge exchanges with the knowledge requirements and suggest an appropriate modeling 
approach for the context of engineering projects.  
From the above summary of the theoretical developments in the field of engineering 
design project organizations it is visible that economic aspects of the organizational scope 
and form are not captured in the analyses. The aim of this study is to suggest complementing 
the knowledge missing in this gap. To achieve this, the following section will introduce some 
of the most famous economic concepts that can be applied to study the economic 
organization of design in engineering projects. The subsequent part of the paper will 
introduce an conceptual explanatory framework for interpreting the economics of the design 
organization in engineering projects.    
 
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
To fill the gap of missing economic interpretations of the design organization and its 
scope the present section will summarize some of the most prominent contributions in 
discussing the economic boundaries of organization and subsequently embed the economic 
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theory of the firm into the engineering project organizations body of knowledge to develop a 
theoretical concept that captures both fields.     
 
Organizational Boundaries and the Structure of the Industry 
A specific stream of literature discusses the theoretical underpinnings of the economic 
organization. The focus of this theoretical stream is the scope and the boundaries of the 
economic organization, as opposed to an open market setting. The discussion on the 
organizational boundaries originated with the Coase’s (1937) famous essay on the firm 
boundaries and has not seen much obvious development until the appearance of transaction 
cost theory that is concerned with discussing the existence of firms as integrated economic 
entities as opposed to a number of economic transactions in the open market (e.g., 
Williamson 1985, 1996). Apart from the field of transaction cost economics, the property 
rights theory has also made a major contribution to the discussion of the organizational 
boundaries (Holmström and Roberts 1998; Holmstrom 1999; Hart and Holmstrom 2010).  
The summary of the most important contributions seems to be that economic 
boundaries of organizations define the allocation of asset ownership that enable control over 
the operations, which is important in a world of incomplete contracts and asymmetric 
information. The notion of the firm has, in turn, been the most widely used concept of the 
economic organization in literature. The currently accepted argument for the existence of 
firms seems to be that firms provide the solution to the so called “hold-up problem”. The 
hold-up problem occurs when either of the two sides of the transaction makes an up-front 
investment in the transaction which causes the other side to behave opportunistically and 
induce ex-post bargaining. The hold-up situation allows the side that invested less in the 
transaction to impose its conditions opportunistically on the side who made the upfront 
investment. The result of this discussion is the dichotomy between the market and the 
hierarchy as the basic modes of governance, whereby the former is characterized by third-
party contracting and the latter by in-house manufacturing of goods and services.  
However, literature has also acknowledged hybrid forms of organization that do not 
belong entirely to either the firm or the market area. Such organizations are termed as 
subcontracting arrangements, networks of firms, alliances, and partnerships (Ménard 2004).  
Such hybrid arrangements are particularly pronounced in the construction industry, as 
was first acknowledged by Stinchcombe (1959) who analyzed why the industry favors 
subcontracting over bureaucratic hierarchies much more than the manufacturing sector. 
Eccles (1981b, a) appears to have initiated the discussion of viewing the construction process 
as a stream of transactions in his seminal work on the quasi-firm in the construction industry. 
In essence, Eccles argued that project complexity, size, and the market extent result in 
extensive and recurring subcontracting in construction. 
From these early studies there has been not much development in terms of economic 
theorizing of the construction industry structure until relatively recently. The structure of the 
industry has been identified as a “loosely coupled system” that defines the interaction of 
resources at the levels of both projects and firms (Dubois and Gadde 2002; Dorée and 
Holmen 2004). The interaction of resources at the project level is thus defined with “tight 
couplings”, while the interaction within the organization across different projects with “loose 
couplings”. The question of determining the firm boundaries persists throughout these 
studies.  
 
The Economic Interplay between the Project and the Firm  
 line with literature that provides evidence that not only ownership provides incentive 
for the establishment of an organization (Holmström and Roberts 1998) we will summarize 
contributions relating to the project, as the most prominent organizational form found in 
Proceedings – EPOC 2012 Conference 
 
6 
 
engineering. The project is a hybrid between the firm and the market setting in that its 
management structure is a feature of the temporary project structure and asset ownership a 
feature of the permanent firm structure.   
Reve and Levitt (1984) initiated the project-level economic discussion by using 
transaction cost analysis to discuss contracts as a mechanism to govern the client-consultant-
contractor relationships in a construction project. Walker and Kwong Wing (1999), on the 
other hand, present project management activities as transaction costs in construction 
projects. They argue that the role of project management is minimizing the sum of production 
and transaction costs on behalf of the client.  
These studies present analyses at the project level as the majority of economic activity 
in engineering projects, particularly construction, occurs in the form of discrete projects, as 
opposed to continuous production activity. Since the firm is the basic form of asset ownership 
in the construction and other engineering sectors, the project and firm levels of analysis 
should be linked theoretically.  
Winch (1989) seems to have been the first to introduce the theoretical project-firm 
dichotomy of the industry, whereby firms, not projects, make decisions about resource 
allocation transactions. Winch (2001) also subsequently proposed a conceptual framework 
for governing the construction process across both the participants in the project chain and 
the resources that each of the participant uses to deliver the work.   
 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE OF DESIGN AND ENGINEERING 
By drawing from both economic and design and engineering literature, a recent study 
by the authors of this paper focused on intra-firm governance of design and engineering in a 
multinational company as a stream of transactions between knowledge contributions from the 
company network of offices and the contracting office (Zerjav et al. 2012). In this 
representation, the transaction consists of applying design knowledge to a project-specific 
situation. The project creates the demand for domain-specific expert knowledge that needs to 
be complemented with expertise residing within the design team or outside of it. This means 
that sourcing the project with design expertise occurs in a knowledge market that needs to be 
managed through discrete transactions. 
The study emphasized the existence of intra-firm organizational interfaces that define 
market relations internally to the multinational firm on the basis of different domains of 
knowledge. Different modes (i.e. local vs. distributed) of governing the design from the 
perspective of the contracting office are, therefore, on the basis of individual economic 
transactions conducted across different firm offices.  
Although the existence of the firm presupposes integration based on asset ownership, 
the study showed that even within the stable firm structure, market conditions may apply. 
This is in line with the Holstrom’s (1999) concept of the firm as a subeconomy, where the 
ownership assumes the role of a controlling mechanism similarly to the role of the state in 
regulating markets in macroeconomics literature. On the basis of the above firm-level study, 
we propose an economic concept for project-level design organization using economic 
concepts of organizational boundaries.  
The main difference between the firm- and the project-level approaches is in the 
reversal of the dependent and independent variables of the study. In the previous analysis the 
dependent variable was the internal economic activity and the firm was regarded as a stable 
network of assets, thus an independent variable. The present study, by contrast, will regard 
the economic activity of design production as an independent variable, from which it will 
draw conclusions about the scope and form of the corresponding design organization, thereby 
considered as the dependent variable.   
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Framework for Project-level Economics of the Design Organization 
The conceptual framework that we present considers the flow of knowledge exchange 
within the continuously shifting supply and demand sides of the design organization. This 
knowledge exchange is represented as a stream of economic transactions, defined in 
transaction cost economics theory. Because of the intertwining information interdependence 
between the design tasks, an efficient exchange of knowledge that occurs between any of the 
designers will need to be distributed across the entire design system. When this is interpreted 
through the lens of economic transactions, it follows that any one transaction will generally 
cause an undetermined amount of other transactions in the design system. This makes 
determining the boundaries of the project organization a complicated economic 
consideration.  Figure 1 represents the notion of design coordination and integration in the 
light of economic transactions.  
 
C1
D2
D3
D1
C2
 
Figure 1: Design coordination and integration as a flow of transactions 
The figure represents a hypothetical organizational setting on a project where interaction 
occurs between design offices D1, D2, and D3 and construction companies C1 and C2. In 
terms of design, the hold-up problem in this example manifests in integration problems as 
well as the number of design iterations needed to achieve the final solution. Once a design 
office has been appointed to contribute to the project with its knowledge, they will have the 
ability to manipulate the properties of their contribution in a way that will determine its 
integration with other design components. Thus, by behaving opportunistically, a design team 
might ensure further income from the project through a mechanism known in 
microeconomics as ex-post bargaining. In order to mitigate such hold-up problems, 
organizations form either long-term partnerships or alliances, or even engage in recurrent 
subcontracting as a form of the quasi-firm.  As opposed to the hold-up problem within the 
design supply chain of the project, the same issue occurs at the interface between design and 
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construction organizations. Because design and construction are complementary fields of 
expertise, the hold-up problem occurs when either of the sides takes advantage of the 
established relationship for opportunistic ex post bargaining. As a result, arrangements such 
as design and build are devised, to integrate the two sides under the same interest and, thus, 
mitigate the hold-up problem.  
The above concept describes integrated organizational arrangements in engineering 
project sectors from the perspective of firm economics. The arrows between the circles in 
Figure 1 them represent multiple organizational couplings in the form of mutual 
interdependence. Following the analogy about transaction costs as organizational friction, 
design coordination efforts can be represented as transaction costs in the overall project.    
To further corroborate that the above derived conceptual framework captures the 
economic considerations on boundaries of design organizations, we illustrate it with findings 
from a research study that gives phenomenological evidence for the hypothetical framework.   
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The study supporting the conceptual framework from this paper is interpretive nature 
and consists of a major public-funded railway engineering design-build project. The 
reasoning for choosing a single case study is that, due to the size of the project, it is well 
aligned with the Yin’s (2003) concept of the critical case that emphasises the issues under 
investigation. The data collection included extensive interviews with project management, 
validated by comparison against the internal project database as well as against the publicly 
available material. The aim of the data collection in interviews was to reduce ambiguity 
through retrospective sensemaking by having all the relevant data after the project had 
finished (Weick et al. 2009; Winch and Maytorena 2009). The case study is retrospective 
because the decisions that affected the project events can, in such cases, only be evaluated ex 
post.  
Instead of using the standardized protocols with a single interpretation of the data 
collected, this research collected data in a manner that supports the cognitive and interpretive 
nature of design. This is done through the open ended interviews that opened the possibility 
of different interpretations based on the informants’ sensemaking of the subject matter. When 
combined with secondary and tertiary sources of data, the overall data collection was 
immensely rich and requireed an iterative process of qualitative coding and complementing 
with theoretical concepts. The research method chosen, therefore, produces the iterative loop 
of qualitative theory building and hypothesis testing, very similar to the process of design 
itself (Eisenhardt 1989; Friedman 2003).   
The case project involved extending a section of a rapid transit urban railway system 
and incorporating it into the suburban rail system of a congested European metropolitan area. 
The scope of works comprised partial extension of tracks, replacement of track and signaling 
equipment, construction of four new stations and refurbishment of five old stations. The 
project was particularly demanding in civil works as long sections of the track were on 
viaducts and in tunnels.  
The core project organization included the public agency owner and the contractor. 
Because the owner organization did not have substantial experience in railway construction, 
they appointed a project management organization to manage the project on their behalf. 
Concurrently, the contractor’s organization mobilized an engineering department for the 
project with the aim of coordinating design and construction. The project also had three 
major external stakeholders, being representatives of the urban and the suburban rail systems 
as well as the operating company. The former two had the role of ensuring that the newly 
built section complied with the existing standards of both networks and the latter had the role 
to ensure that the delivered facility complied with their train operating procedures.  
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The design scope was organized in disciplinary work packages and geographic design 
areas. The disciplinary work packages comprised civil design, structures, buildings and 
services, mechanical and electrical systems in buildings, and design of accompanying rail 
systems. Each work package was further broken down into design areas defined as 
“geographical groups of neighboring work packages or a logical system comprising a number 
of subsystem work packages”. Because of its fragmentation, the project developed an 
Interface Management Plan to identify and manage issues that would occur between work 
packages, design areas and organizations in the design supply chain. As the design evolved, 
the identified project interfaces were planned to be translated into requirements for each of 
the design contributors.  
At the peak of the design, a total of around 600 of design staff were contributing to 
the project off site, which exploded the number of requirements to be handled. There were 
around 6000 requirements and about two thirds of them were changed or modified as the 
project unfolded. These changing requirements were the key source of design fragmentation 
issues that this study presents in the light of the corresponding design organization.   
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The present section will provide illustrative empirical evidence for the above-derived 
notion of transaction cost issues and boundaries of the project design organization. In general, 
the informants involved in the management of design were emphasizing issues with poor 
design integration that caused substantial rework and other related problems downstream in 
the design and construction process.     
To illustrate the fluent notion of the project design organization, we will mention that 
the resource allocation for the design organization was not following the initially-defined 
work packages, in that many parts of design work were distributed to different units, some of 
which had no relation with the original project whatsoever. As an informant in an executive 
position of the program management organization explained:  
At that time, the demand for specialist skills was so high in the [local] area that [the 
main designer] needed to get capacity elsewhere. For their part, they were using about ten 
offices scattered around the country and some abroad.   
This situation caused an additional level of fragmentation within the design supply 
chain with a new kind of project interface that had to be taken into account. This significantly 
augmented the number of different designers contributing to the project and further 
exacerbated design fragmentation as opposed to the initial plan. As a result, the burden on the 
management became more pronounced as the coordination meetings were now including up 
to 60 design managers who were responsible for different parts of the design.  
Coordinating large numbers of remote design teams was challenging, especially 
within boundaries of a single organization whose contributions were mutually incompatible 
due to inconsistent management practices across different offices. The director of the 
engineering organization summarized the issue:   
People had to travel long distances to meet up for meetings and communication was a 
problem in general. They were, for instance, using different expansion joints in different 
offices. We also found that they used different procedures in different offices. Standardization 
was a problem even within a single organization.    
Each of the remote offices within would create its own requirements for the rest of the 
offices and synchronizing them by a common standard was time consuming and created 
tensions amongst the contracting designer’s team members. The tensions could only be 
resolved by using the organizational hierarchy as the engineering director put it:  
We had to say: You’ve got to do it the same as this bloke, if you know what I mean. 
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The result of this intra-disciplinary synchronization was significant iterative rework, 
depending on the complexity of a particular interface where parts of the design would meet. 
This rework and problems at the design interfaces can be considered transaction cost 
problems at the project level. A quote from the engineering organization director further 
elaborates the managerial sensemaking of this issue. 
With people working remotely, you will never get everybody fitting together at the 
first shot, in design. Sometimes it takes two or three shots.   
All these examples from the case study suggest that boundaries of the design 
organization are difficult to determine when only using the formal documents such as 
contracts and schedules. Our interpretation of the data analyzed suggests that the occurrence 
of transaction costs in the project took the form of schedule delays, travel costs, design 
iteration loops, and additional management time, another form of transaction costs, needed to 
be put into the project to alleviate all these issues. The boundaries of the design organization 
should have, therefore, been designed by using a more theoretically-grounded economic 
rationale instead of opportunistic subcontracting causing significant hold-up problems. The 
cause of the hold-up problem was the interdependency of the contributions that needed to 
integrate in the design of a project that is by its nature, an integrated and continuous structure. 
By subcontracting merely on the basis of man-hours demand, the management team of the 
project omitted the fact that poorly integrated design has the potential to cause so many hold-
up problems that the actual project organization will need to shift its focus on additional 
investment into organizational relationships that might not even provide any added value for 
the project. If the hold-up problem was not resolved at the level of the relationship causing it, 
the fragmentation problem dissipated into the entire design which caused a significant loss of 
managerial control over the design effort.  
As the final piece of empirical evidence of the existence of the hold-up problem in the 
design organization, we include a quote that the engineering director uttered when asked 
about the best way to mitigate design fragmentation issues in future projects: 
A lesson for the future would be that if you could somehow limit the number of people 
involved in the parallel design process and if you could have them sitting in the same 
building and actually working together, that would be very helpful. 
The emphasis on “people actually working together” seems to be an indication to 
reconsider the notion of organization boundaries in designing large-scale engineering projects 
in an attempt to reduce the likelihood and impact for the hold-up problem within the project 
boundaries.   
 
THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the basis of the theory derived and empirical data present, we extract several 
theoretical propositions accompanied with several implications for the practice of managing 
engineering design project organizations. We, thus, deduce the following theoretical 
propositions from the above theory:  
1. Design concerns a flow of knowledge exchange transactions in the market of 
expertise. As the most distinct difference from the classical production systems, the 
breakdown of scope and temporal sequencing of tasks in design should be taken very 
flexibly as the project structure can be much more fluid than what is normally the case 
in construction.  
2. Because design concerns the production of information on the basis of individual 
interdependent contributions, the hold-up problem is a significant issue in design 
organizations.  
3. The social structure and information processing in the design organization is more 
similar to a network than the traditional hierarchical structure of organizations. As a 
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consequence, relational contracting seems a much more meaningful approach for 
establishing and maintaining the relationships than relying on classical contracting 
forms and procurement routes. 
From these theoretical propositions, we propose a relatively wide area of practical 
implications of the project-level framework: 
1. Because of the fluid structure of the design organization, tools from traditional project 
management should not be used so much for controlling purposes as much as means 
for discussion and ensuring a common understanding of the design scope and content. 
2. Instead of thinking about design as a hierarchical structure, managers should think of 
it as a decentralized social network. The allocation of tasks should also take into 
account the network context of the design organization. The relationships between the 
members of the network should be based on trust validated through previous 
collaboration.  
3. Design & Build contractual arrangements for project delivery do not necessarily 
accomplish integration of the design project structure, as construction managers can 
overlook the nature of the hold-up problem in design when appointing the design 
team of the project.   
4. The relatively independent design tasks can be compiled without the risk of the hold-
up problem, thus, they do not need to be a part of the design organization.   
Although the theoretical propositions and practical implications of this study should be 
further validated by future studies, we believe that, even in this stage, they can provide a 
valuable tool for managerial thinking in the design project organization context.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study contributes to theory with an economic representation of the design 
organization based on the notion of avoiding the hold-up problem in a stream of knowledge 
transactions in the market of expertise. We believe it is a novel and promising approach for 
analyzing both project- and firm-level issues in design management. This approach argues for 
identifying the tight couplings in projects (Dubois and Gadde 2002; Dorée and Holmen 2004) 
in the light of the hold-up problem. The tight couplings and the hold-up problem will become 
visible as the design integration issue in the situation when the design organization needs to 
address a requirement. This complements Winch’s (2001) recommendation of governing the 
design process internally. In other cases, the design organization may choose a more flexible 
market-based approach which will determine the boundaries of the core design organization 
for the engineering project.  
This study further extends the previous author’s study on internal governance in 
multinational design organizations (Zerjav et al. 2012) with a project perspective on the hold-
up problem and the corresponding organization boundaries. While the former study took the 
basis of the transaction-based theory to look at the implications of a relatively stable 
organization structure for its governance modes, the present study used the economic concept 
of the hold-up problem as an argument to identify boundaries of the temporary design 
organization encountered in engineering projects.  
The conclusions at the project-level of analysis advocate the integrated structure of 
the design organization in engineering projects to reduce transaction costs that occur 
whenever mutually interdependent organizational entities engage in a joint effort. Similarly to 
recent discussions that advocate the use of centralized information to facilitate decentralized 
organizational decision making in engineering project organizations (Levitt 2011; Whyte and 
Levitt 2011), this study advocates the centralization at the information-level of design rather 
than at the formal and hierarchical level of the organization. This also contributes to the 
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notion of determining the boundaries of project organizations as networks as recently 
suggested by  Chinowsky and Taylor (2012). 
The nature of theory presented in this paper is mostly descriptive with the main aim to 
provide a basis for discussing aspects of the design organization for engineering projects 
using a simple explanatory economic rationale. Future studies should bring the argument 
further and continue relating it to the already existing literature that applies economic theory 
to various levels of analyzing engineering project organizations. Since theory presented is 
explanatory, further research should be directed towards the development of normative and 
predictive theories. All this will ultimately lead to a more profound understanding of the 
alignment between the design process in the context of engineering projects, engineering 
industries, and the wider society.   
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